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SEEKING COMMON SENSE FOR THE COMMON 
LAW OF COMMON INTEREST IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
Jared S. Sunshine+ 
“Suffice to say, it is impossible to conclude that the common law, as 
interpreted in this and other jurisdictions, provides a clear 
explanation of what a common interest is.”1 
 
The attorney-client privilege is the most ancient and revered of the 
evidentiary protections cognizable at common law.2  At base, it provides that 
communications between attorney and client are undiscoverable so long as 
their purpose is legal and the exchange remains confidential.3  Its nouveau 
riche kinsman, the work product privilege,4 may be later to the scene, but has 
rapidly established itself as a central aegis of the American adversarial 
system.5  Rather than focusing on communications with counsel, it shields any 
documents prepared in preparation for litigation.6  Yet both are often frustrated 
                                                 
 + J.D., cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Columbia College of 
Columbia University in the City of New York, 2004.  The views expressed in this Article are the 
author’s alone, and do not represent those of the abovesaid entities or any other. 
 1. Miller v. Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 2. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications known to the common law.”); 1 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 1:1-2 (2d ed. 1999).  See generally Geoffrey Hazard, An 
Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978). 
 3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90 (1981); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 
(1976); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should 
Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 866–67 (1998) (observing that clients can waive the attorney-
client privilege by “voluntarily disclosing a communication to third parties, [or] failing to take 
reasonable precautions to preserve the confidentiality [of information].”). 
 4. Although many sources use the terminology “protection” rather than “privilege” in 
regard to work product, this Article adopts the latter in view of the usual outcome that material 
protected under the work product doctrine is in fact privileged from discovery.  See generally 
Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 917, 
923 (1982). See also, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992) (referring 
to both attorney-client and work product as privileges); cf. infra note 34 and accompanying text 
(discussing terminology in regard of other evidentiary privileges). 
 5. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow 
Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1050 (D. Del. 1985) (“When compared to the seasoned 
existence of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine stands as a virtual newcomer 
to federal jurisprudence.”). 
 6. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397–98; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–40 (1975); 
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
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by the modern complexity of legal actions.7  Where once the attorney served as 
confidante to a single client, contemporary corporate counsel regularly find 
themselves advising sprawling multipartite enterprises working in tandem with 
others to achieve their goals.8  As the Supreme Court has explained, given “the 
vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern 
corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, ‘constantly go to lawyers to 
find out how to obey the law’ . . . particularly since compliance with the law in 
this area is hardly an instinctive matter.”9 
Adapting venerable common law to such changing times has not proven 
easy.  In particular, the attorney-client privilege has long been said to require 
strict confidentiality, lest its protections be waived.10  Commentators have 
often noted that waiver may be a misnomer, since clients normally do not 
willingly forgo the privilege, but rather forfeit it involuntarily or inadvertently 
through actions inconsistent with secrecy.11  Any sort of third party—even 
advisors relevant to rendering legal advice—endangers the inviolability of the 
protected conversation.12  The risk is almost greater for the fact that forfeiture 
                                                 
 7. See Rice, supra note 3, at 863–65; Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: 
Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 77–78 (2005). 
 8. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 3, at 863–65. 
 9. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bryson B. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in 
the Corporate Arena, 24 BUS. LAW 901, 913 (1969)); see also In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 
235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn. 
1976). 
 10. Rice, supra note 3, at 853–57 (“In all formal definitions of the attorney-client privilege, 
whether employed in state or federal courts, the client or the attorney must communicate with the 
other in confidence, and subsequently that confidentiality must have been maintained.”); see Hunt 
v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“But the privilege is that of the client alone, and no rule 
prohibits the latter from divulging his own secrets; and if the client has voluntarily waived the 
privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the mouth of the attorney.”); United States v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of 
such a privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.”). 
 11. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK 
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 390 (5th ed. 2007); cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) 
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“Waiver is different from forfeiture. 
Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”)); United States v. Wesley, 422 F.3d 509, 520 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“A forfeiture is basically an oversight; a waiver is a deliberate decision”). But cf. 
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 788 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled 
October 18, 1979 (Appeal of Malfitano), 633 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980)) (“No matter what 
standard of waiver [of privilege] is applied, the waiver must be knowing.”). 
 12. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2311 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“One of the 
circumstances by which it is commonly apparent that the communication is not confidential is the 
presence of a third person”); e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Del. 
1982) (“The presence of nonessential third parties not needed for the transmittal of the 
information will negate the privilege.”). 
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can be unpredictable.13  Such severe strictures hearken back to the origins of 
the privilege with barristers as tradesmen-cum-gentlemen, leading to the 
corollary that the attorney-client privilege was a sort of trade secret attendant 
to their gentlemanly calling.14  Behavior inconsistent with secrecy negated the 
privilege,15 and such a privilege was by definition confined to the litigation on 
which the barrister was instructed.16 
As time passed, however, these traditional contours of privilege law 
increasingly fell short of serving their desired objectives.17  Attorney-client 
privilege expanded from barristers engaged in a case at bar to encompass any 
legal matter.18  Indeed, the very purpose of the privilege was reconceived as 
not an adjunct to the gentleman esquire, but a right vested in the client to 
confide in his chosen counselor.19  From a public policy perspective, the 
                                                 
 13. Compare, e.g., In re G-I Holdings, 218 F.R.D. 428, 434–35 (D.N.J. 2003) (accountant 
present to explain client’s proposed tax structure to counsel negated privilege), and Calvin Klein 
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (privilege negated in 
communications with public relations firm), with FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147–48 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (privilege upheld in communications with public relations firm), United States v. 
Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1963) (privilege upheld through intermediary), and Miller 
v. Haulmark Transp. Sys., 104 F.R.D. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (privilege also upheld through 
intermediary). 
 14. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and 
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 487 (1928) (“Since some lawyers were gentlemen almost virtute 
officii, the common obligation of gentlemen not to betray a confidence reposed in them 
constituted, as Dean Wigmore has shown, the original basis of the protection accorded to 
communications between barrister and those who instructed him.”); Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070 
(observing that “some of the early cases express the idea that the privilege was that of the lawyer 
(a gentlemen does not give away matters confided to him)”); id. at 1071 (explaining that “at one 
time the privilege was thought to belong to the lawyer rather than the client [because] [a] barrister 
was considered not merely an ‘officer’ of the court but a member of it, who could no more 
properly be asked to reveal a client’s confidences than a modern judge could be asked to disclose 
matters heard in camera”). 
 15. See, e.g., Blackburn, 128 U.S. at 470. 
 16. See Radin, supra note 14, at 487; see also Hazard, supra note 2, at 1090–91 (“As one 
can see, ‘tradition,’ both English and American, thus clearly sustained a privilege confined to 
those communications that are related directly to pending or anticipated litigation.”). 
 17. See Radin, supra note 14, at 487–91; compare Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070–73, with 
id. at 1075–85. 
 18. See generally Hazard, supra note 2, at 1073–85; see also WIGMORE, supra note 12,  
§§ 2294–95 at 558–62, 565; Spectrum Sys. Int’l. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 
(N.Y. 1991) (stating “the attorney-client privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation”). 
 19. See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070 (“as the rule developed the privilege became that of 
the client to have his secrets protected”); RICE, supra note 2, § 1:3 at 8–9.  By contrast, the work 
product privilege is held jointly by both attorney and client, and can be asserted by either. See In 
re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Accordingly, the work product privilege was 
adequately asserted below by both the Lawyer and the appellant.”); see also In re Sealed Case, 
676 F.2d 793, 812 n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that the “work product privilege belongs to the 
lawyer as well as the client”). 
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privilege now sought to encourage clients to consult early and often with 
learned counsel, both to avoid litigation ab initio, and to preserve counsel’s 
ability to elicit the full facts necessary to discharge their professional 
responsibilities without compromising their clients.20  Nonetheless, the 
primeval necessity of strictest secrecy has persisted,21 notwithstanding cogent 
arguments from respected scholars that it should be relaxed in light of modern 
circumstances.22 
This Article explores the contours of confidentiality amongst multiple 
parties, specifically with reference to communications between competitors 
and combining companies, and the D.C. Circuit whose precedent is so 
important in such antitrust matters.  Part I sets forth the related joint defense 
and common interest doctrines that define privilege where more than one client 
is involved, seeking to slice through the lack of clarity about their parameters 
to identify how they overlap and differ.  In particular, this Part focuses on the 
so-called litigation requirement, which would problematically deny privilege to 
multiple parties that are not actively confronting a lawsuit.  Part II examines 
precedent on these issues in the D.C. Circuit, identifying how certain 
misconceptions have flourished and how they might be resolved.  Finally, Part 
III looks to the rationales behind the best reconciliation of the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ precedent with many of its sister circuits and public policy 
considerations. 
As with many issues at law, the commentariat is sharply split as to the 
proper metes and bounds of privilege.23  Some have forcefully argued that 
common interest privilege is an incoherent or ill-conceived excrescence of 
traditionally narrow privilege law.24  Others have defended common interest as 
                                                 
 20. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 407 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 398 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); 
Radin, supra note 14, at 490; see also United States v. BDO Seidelman LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 
(7th Cir. 2007) (finding advance consultation with attorneys “serves the public interest by 
advancing compliance with the law”); Spectrum, 581 N.E.2d at 1061 (“Legal advice is often 
sought, and rendered, precisely to avoid litigation”). 
 21. See  RICE, supra note 2, at 853–57. 
 22. See generally id. at 888–91, 893–98 (hypothesizing what a more relaxed approach to the 
attorney-client privilege would be like if the requirement of confidentiality was lost and what it 
would mean for attorney-client communications). 
 23. See generally Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege 
Should Not Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 475 
(2012) (proposing limitations on the attorney-client privilege, including removing the privilege in 
the “allied lawyer setting”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Symposium on Criminal Discovery, The 
Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the 
Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection,  68 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 19 (1990) (questioning the practice of applying the attorney-client privilege to non-
testifying expert witnesses). 
 24. See Geisel, supra note 23, at 475, 480–87. Extending attorney-client privilege in 
common interest situations has been criticized for “not encourag[ing] frank attorney-client 
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supported by the same rationale as the underlying privilege, with little cost to 
the search for truth.25  And well-heeled scholars have more generally decried 
the strictures of confidentiality and called for a still-broader conception of 
privilege.26  Looking to the Supreme Court’s holdings, this author would tend 
to side more with a broader privilege, recognizing its invaluable role in the 
development of the modern legal profession and representation.27  Nonetheless, 
clarification of the common interest doctrine, notably in the D.C. Circuit, is 
imperative to ensure that parties may depend on the application of whatever 
view ultimately prevails.28 
I.  THE COMMON LAW OF COMMON INTEREST 
Nowhere is secrecy more problematic than where companies collaborate 
towards a common legal end, as happens frequently in an age of global 
interdependency.29  If they seek to retain common counsel in a lawsuit, or their 
respective counsel cooperate on issues of mutual importance, they might once 
have been thought to forfeit their privilege.30  The judicial response was the 
development of two closely related doctrines generally known as joint defense 
(or, on the other side of the aisle, joint prosecution) and common interest.31  
Under these analyses, materials disclosed between parties allied in a lawsuit or 
sharing a common legal interest remain privileged from discovery, 
notwithstanding the presence of a nominal third party.32  These doctrines are 
not freestanding privileges, but exceptions or exemptions preventing forfeiture 
of the underlying attorney-client or work product privilege.33  Nonetheless, it 
                                                                                                                 
communications that can improve legal representation, which is the heart of the privilege’s 
purpose.” Id. at 482. In addition, “[o]ther proposed justifying rationales—such as increased 
efficiency of representation, increased efficiency of the judicial system, or increased effectiveness 
of representation—cannot survive cost-benefit analysis.” Id. 
 25. See generally Schaffzin, supra note 7; see also James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client 
Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging 
Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 634 (1997). 
 26. See generally Rice, supra note 3, at 856–60; cf. Douglas R. Richmond, The Case 
Against Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Immunity, 30 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 253 (2006) (illustrating some of the difficulties that arise from strict 
confidentiality requirements, including those arising from selective waivers of confidentiality). 
 27. Rice, supra note 3, at 856–60. 
 28. See generally supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., Inc., No. 970325, 2000 WL 33171004, 
at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2000); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 77–78 (discussing and quoting 
at length). 
 30. See supra notes 7–22 and accompanying text. 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 75–76 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 32. See id. § 76 cmt. c. 
 33. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992) (common interest 
or joint defense allows parties “to exchange privileged communications and attorney work 
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will be expedient to refer to them as evidentiary privileges rather than mere 
doctrines, as the result of their application is that otherwise discoverable 
documents remain privileged.34  The vast majority of the states,35 and every 
circuit court of appeals,36 have adopted some form of the joint defense or 
common interest privilege. 
A.  The Menagerie: Co-Clients, Joint Defense, and Common Interest 
An initial question is whether joint defense and common interest are distinct, 
or only different names for the same doctrine.  Further complicating matters, 
there is a third animal in this terminological menagerie, co-client privilege.37  
The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers draws a line between 
this distinct co-client privilege, where multiple clients are represented by the 
same attorney; and common interest, where clients are represented by separate 
counsel as to a shared issue.38  The Restatement then unhelpfully, if candidly, 
points out that “[t]erms such as ‘joint defense’—less frequently, ‘common 
defense’—are sometimes applied to” common interest.39  In fairness, Justice 
Antonin Scalia rightly observed that the rules propounded in modern 
Restatements are often “aspirational” rather than descriptive of judicial 
                                                                                                                 
product in order to adequately prepare a defense without waiving either privilege”); United States 
v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989); Waller v. Financial Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 
579, 583 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 34. E.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 
28 (1st Cir. 1989) (defining “joint defense privilege”); Waller, 828 F.2d at 583 n.7 (same); In re 
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); 
Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437 (N.Y. 1992) (defining “‘common interest’ privilege”); 
United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (defining joint 
defense and common interest privilege).  But see also Oxy Res. Cal. LLC v. Sup. Ct. of Solano 
Cty., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 634–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The ‘joint defense privilege’ and the 
‘common interest privilege’ have not been recognized by statute in California.  For this reason, 
we will refer to the joint defense or common interest doctrine, rather than the joint defense or 
common interest privilege, to avoid suggesting that communications between parties with 
common interests are protected from disclosure by virtue of a privilege separate from the 
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other statutorily recognized 
evidentiary privilege.”) (citations omitted).  By way of comparison, see supra note 4 (discussing 
terminology anent work product). 
 35. See Greg A. Drumright & W. Rick Griffin, Chapter 3: The Joint Defense Doctrine—
Cohesion Among Traditional Adversaries in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE 
COUNSEL 35, 42–43 (Defense Research Institute 2008) (chart showing adoption by state); see 
also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 52–53 n.7. 
 36. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 41 (chart showing adoption by circuit); see 
also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 52–53 n.7. 
 37. See infra note 38 and accompying text. 
 38. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (co-client privilege), with id. § 76 (common interest privilege). 
 39. See id. § 76 (reporters note). 
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consensus.40  Still, many authorities have echoed the Restatement’s 
fundamental division based on singular or multiple counsel.41 
The Restatement is quite correct, in any event, that courts and commentators 
alike have conflated joint defense and common interest doctrines at times.42  
Some expressly make no distinction at all, implicitly finding the difference to 
be mere nomenclature.43  Others, getting closer to the reality, describe the 
earlier development of joint defense theory and its eventual development into 
modern common interest doctrine.44  Many fail to clearly distinguish co-client 
representations at all, viewing them simply as joint defense or common interest 
arrangements with shared rather than separate counsel45—despite nigh-
unanimous admonitions by commentators against conflating co-client with 
joint defense or common interest relationships.46  At least a few courts, 
                                                 
 40. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 1045, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I write 
separately to note that modern Restatements . . . are of questionable value, and must be used with 
caution . . . . And it cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement 
provision describes rather than revises current law.”); see also Jeffrey P. Schomig, The Abililty of 
Trade Associations to Receive Advice on Antitrust and Other Legal Risks: Are These 
Communications Protected from Discovery?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: ANTITRUST & TRADE, 
Vol. 4, No. 6 (2011) (noting that the Restatement of Law is “a guide that carries no independent 
authority”). 
 41. See generally, e.g., Giesel, supra note 23, at 521–23, 533–34. 
 42. See Jason M. Rosenthal, Joint Defense Agreements and the Common Interest Privilege 
in A YOUNG LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DEFENSE PRACTICE 147, 148 (2008) (“The courts frequently 
use the terms ‘joint defense privilege’ and ‘common defense (or common interest) privilege’ 
interchangeably.”); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 275 (“Federal courts have use the term ‘joint 
defense privilege’ to refer to both the joint client privilege and the ‘common interest’ privilege.”). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The joint 
defense privilege [is] also known as the common interest rule[.]”); United States v. Schwimmer, 
892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (opining the “joint defense privilege” should be called the 
“common interest rule”); Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38 (“While the doctrine is 
occasionally referred to by courts and legal scholars as the joint defense privilege or the joint 
defense doctrine, the more appropriate name . . . is the common interest doctrine.”). 
 44. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 248 
(4th Cir. 1990). See also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 61–63. 
 45. In re Teleglobe Comm’n Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 n.18 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[M]uch of the 
caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege (which is the same as the ‘common-interest 
privilege’ . . .) with the co-client privilege.”) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Michael Pavento, Daniel 
H. Marti, Tracie Siddiqui & Patrick Eagan, Applicability of the Common Interest Doctrine for 
Preservation of Attorney-Client Privileged Materials Disclosed During Intellectual Property Due 
Diligence Investigations in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE 353, 353 (2009) 
(describing joint litigant privilege as a subset of common interest in which the clients are 
“represented by the same attorney or different attorneys”). 
 46. See e.g., Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 37 (“The terms joint defense doctrine 
and joint defense privilege should not be confused with the term ‘joint client doctrine.’ The joint 
client doctrine protects confidential communications between co-parties and their common, as 
opposed to separate, counsel.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS  
§ 75 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Co-client representations must also be distinguished from 
situations in which a lawyer represents a single client, but another person with allied interests 
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however, have managed to penetrate the doctrinal disarray to clearly identify 
the three basic species of multi-party privilege: “joint client” (i.e., what the 
Restatement calls co-client), “joint litigant” (i.e., what most courts call joint 
defense or joint prosecution privilege), and “common interest.”47  For the sake 
of consistency and of adhering to the most frequently used terms, this Article 
will follow the Restatement in denominating these three species: co-client, 
joint defense, and common interest privilege.48 
The threesome are best seen as various overlapping stages in the protracted 
evolution of multi-party privilege.  Codefendants have long had the right to 
coordinate a common front and defense by retaining joint counsel, without 
chancing that their strategizing be disclosed.49  Such co-client representations 
were regular occurrences in the early United States, and although they had 
their origin in criminal prosecutions,50 there has never been any bar to clients 
jointly seeking a lawyer’s advice on a civil matter,51 or in matters unconnected 
to litigation at all.52  Corporate persons may avail themselves of co-client 
arrangements no less than natural persons.53  However, the approach and 
                                                                                                                 
cooperates with the client and the client’s lawyer (see § 76).”); see also Giesel, supra note 23, at 
478–80 (advocating for distinguishing joint defense and common interest from co-client 
postures); Fischer, supra note 25, at 634–35 (advocating for distinguishing between the often 
“mangled” use of co-client and co-litigant concepts). 
 47. E.g., Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342, 347–48 (N.D. Ohio 1999); see 
Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 148 (discussing Libbey Glass); see also Fischer, supra note 25, at 
634–35 (distinguishing the three species). 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 75–76 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). Despite its use in the foundational common interest decision Duplan Corp. v. 
Deering Milliken, Inc., this Article rejects the major competitor to the “common interest” 
terminology, “community of interest,” as adding prolixity but not clarity. 397 F. Supp. 1146, 
1159 (D.S.C. 1974).  The two are tantamount at law, however. See In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 
363 n.18 (“[T]he community-of-interest privilege . . . is the same as the ‘common-interest 
privilege[.]’”). 
 49. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 522–23 (“[H]istorically the attorney-client privilege has 
protected communications in joint client settings. Early cases in the United States do not treat this 
application of the privilege as controversial. Rather, it is treated as an accepted and indisputable 
point of law—an inherent side-effect of clients being clients as a group.”). 
 50. See id.; see also, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators’ Privilege and Innocents’ Refuge: 
A New Approach to Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1481 (2002) 
(indicating that early joint-defense agreements were often in criminal matters). 
 51. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 512 n.176; see also Eureka Inv. Corp., N.V. v. Chicago 
Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 52. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (in which co-
clients were involved in corporate divestiture); see also In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 121 B.R. 
794, 796 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (same). 
 53. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:23; see also e.g., Mirant, 326 B.R. at 648 (in which parent 
and subsidiary corporation were co-clients); Santa Fe, 121 B.R. at 796 (same). 
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positions taken by the co-clients must be strictly the same;54 a single lawyer 
could not ethically pursue divergent tactics simultaneously for each of multiple 
co-clients.55  This requirement follows naturally from the very definition of co-
client arrangements: singular counsel representing plural clients.56 
The more generalized joint defense doctrine, allowing for separate counsel, 
arose in criminal suits against natural persons only in the nineteenth century.57  
Like the co-client setting, joint defense has since been applied to companies 
targeted by criminal and civil cases with regularity under the same rationale.58  
                                                 
 54. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:30 at 195 (“When the same attorney simultaneously 
represents two or more clients on the same matter, the individuals being represented are 
considered joint clients.”); e.g., FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
joint client exception presupposes that communications have been ‘made in the course of the 
attorney’s joint representation of a “common interest” of the two parties.’  The term ‘common 
interest’ typically entails an identical (or nearly identical) legal interest as opposed to a merely 
similar interest.” (citations omitted)); Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 854–55 
(7th Cir. 1974); Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(“The court concludes from these factors that the MacKays also shared the same common legal 
interest as H & B and Jack MacKay. Accordingly, the court rules the MacKays had a joint 
attorney-client relationship with Mr. Jacobson.”); see also Rudow v. Cohen, No. 85 Civ. 9323, 
1988 WL 13746, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1988) (finding that the shared privilege only extends to 
the specific subject matter of the joint representation, not other matters).  But see sources cited 
infra note 84 (cataloguing authorities holding that very similar interests can suffice). 
 55. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:30 at 198 (“Such joint representation is permissible from the 
attorney’s perspective as long as it does not create a conflict of interest that will require a division 
of the attorney’s loyalties.”); Giesel, supra note 23, at 481, 519–22; e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 
F. Supp. 1441, 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that when co-clients’ interests “‘diverge and 
become antagonistic, their lawyer must be absolutely impartial between them, which usually 
means that he may represent none of them.’ To hold otherwise would undermine the loyalty and 
trust upon which the attorney-client relationship is based.”) (quoting HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL 
ETHICS 112 (1953)); see also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 396–97 (S.D. Tex. 
1969); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the 
corporate counsel in a derivative securities suit must be different from that for the company and 
directors). But see, e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding the parties were co-clients even whilst the shared lawyer secretly 
colluded with one co-client against the other on a different matter, notwithstanding the patent 
ethical issues); infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Ogden, 202 F.3d at 461. 
 57. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841–42 (Va. 1871); Patricia 
Welles, Comment, Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
321, 324–25 (1981) (“Since Chahoon v. The Commonwealth in 1871, United States courts have 
recognized the attorney-client privilege in a joint defense. The general rule for joint defense 
situations can be stated simply. If individually retained attorneys for codefendants communicate 
in the furtherance of a joint defense, that communication is privileged.”); see also Giesel, supra 
note 23, at 504–08, 531, 536; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 58–59. 
 58. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 287 (“The concept of a joint or common defense has 
long since been extended to the civil context.”); RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 254 nn.22–23 (“The 
protection is available in both criminal and civil contexts.”); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 59–60 
(“In the 1942 case Schmitt v. Emery, the Supreme Court of Minnesota became the first court to 
extend this joint defense privilege beyond the criminal context into the civil arena[.]”); Giesel, 
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By its nature, joint defense focuses on the alignment of the parties for a 
specific litigation, whether overtly threatened or pending.59  This can be seen 
vividly in the emergence of the mirror-image, joint prosecution privilege to 
protect communications and work product exchanged by coplaintiffs.60  The 
privilege extends to any statements in furtherance of defense strategy and 
positioning, even if the individual approach actually taken differs between 
defendants to the point of adversity.61  Although some loosely labeled “joint 
defense” arrangements involve co-clients represented by the same counsel,62 
joint defense as a distinct privilege implies separate counsel acting in concert.63  
This distinction is crucial:64 unlike the co-client posture, there is no ethical or 
practical bar to separate counsel coordinating strategy but ultimately making 
different choices that are best for their respective clients.65  As the Fourth 
Circuit summed up: 
                                                                                                                 
supra note 23, at 531 (“First applied in Chahoon v. Commonwealth as a privilege applicable only 
in allied lawyer settings involving criminal matters in reference to a joint defense, courts now 
apply the privilege in both criminal and civil settings.” (citations omitted)); see also W. Fuels 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Burlington N.R. Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984). 
 59. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38 (The privilege “affords protection to 
confidential communications among jointly aligned co-parties and their separate counsel . . . .”); 
Welles, supra note 57, at 324–25; see also, Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (in which the husband and wife were both prosecuted for income tax infractions). 
 60. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 63–65; Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38; In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249–50 (4th Cir. 1990); 
United States ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680, 685–86 (S.D. Cal. 1996) 
(citing Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249); Loustalet v. Refco, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 243, 247 
(C.D. Cal. 1993); Sedlacek v. Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 331 (C.D. 
Cal. 1992). 
 61. See Welles, supra note 57, at 328–30 (citing cases for the “reality of joint defense—
namely, that defendants’ interests often coincide only on certain issues”); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN 
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.03 (1982) (discussing the 
Supreme Court Standard 503, lawyer-client privilege); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–
88 (3d Cir. 1985) (“We agree with the district court’s ruling that the correspondence was 
privileged, since it is best viewed as part of an ongoing and joint effort to set up a common 
defense strategy between a defendant and an attorney who was responsible for coordinating a 
common defense position.  Communications to an attorney to establish a common defense 
strategy are privileged even though the attorney represents another client with some adverse 
interests.”) (citing United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979)); Hunydee, 
355 F.2d at 184–85 (describing criminal codefendants contemplating whether each should testify 
against the other); see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349–50 (9th Cir. 1964). 
 62. See, e.g., Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(describing the “‘joint-defense privilege,’ where two or more co-defendants are frequently 
represented by a single attorney”); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 353. 
 63. See, e.g., Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184–85; Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249. 
 64. See sources cited supra notes 45–46; see also, e.g., Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184 (in which 
separate counsel was obtained “[b]ecause of a possible conflict of interest” between husband and 
wife). 
 65. See JEROME G. SNIDER, HOWARD A. ELLINS & MICHAEL S. FLYNN, CORPORATE 
PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 4.06 (2006) (“In the joint defense context, each 
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Whether an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly 
interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the 
litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for 
the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a 
common interest in litigation should be able to communicate with 
their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively 
prosecute or defend their claims.66 
What then is common interest?  By comparison to the previous two privileges, 
the common interest doctrine reaches further, protecting materials 
communicated amongst cooperating parties and their separate counsel on any 
matter in which they share a common legal interest.67  Such an interest would 
not necessarily depend upon alignment in adversarial proceedings (as in joint 
defense),68 nor upon the retention of common counsel (as for co-clients).69  
                                                                                                                 
individual party has his or her own attorney and attorney-client relationship, there may be clear 
conflicts of interest among the parties, and communications among the parties may be guarded.  
In the multiple client context, there is only one lawyer for all the parties, the parties have either no 
conflicts of interest or have agreed to take the risks involved in such a situation, and generally 
speak freely when communicating with the common lawyer.”); see also In re Teleglobe 
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In particular, because co-clients agree to 
share all information related to the matter of common interest with each other and to employ the 
same attorney, their legal interests must be identical (or nearly so) in order that an attorney can 
represent them all with the candor, vigor, and loyalty that our ethics require . . . . In the 
community-of-interest context, on the other hand, because the clients have separate attorneys, 
courts can afford to relax the degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying 
that their attorneys’ ability to represent them zealously and single-mindedly will suffer.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 66. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th 
Cir. 1990). 
 67. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 290 (“Unlike the joint defense privilege, the common 
interest does not require or imply that an actual suit is or ever will be pending. It does require, 
however, that a definable common interest exist.”); RICE, supra note  2, § 4:35 at 244–45 (“The 
‘community of interest’ rule is distinguished from the ‘joint defense’ rule by the fact that the 
collaboration between the parties need not be related to a pending legal action.”); Fischer, supra 
note 25, at 632–34. 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000); RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 244–45; EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 275 (“For instance, 
one can have a common interest which will allow the sharing of privileged communications 
without waiver without having a ‘joint defense’ to any pending or prospective litigation at all, 
either actual at the time that the privilege is shared or prospective.”); id. at 290; Pampered Chef v. 
Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2010)  (“The privilege does not require that the 
interest be in litigation or that litigation be actual or imminent for communications to be 
privileged. So, the fact that Ms. Salela is not a defendant in this case—which plaintiff suggests 
scotches the common interest doctrine—does not matter.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs 
from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”); id. cmt. b 
(“Clients thus can elect separate representation while maintaining the privilege in cooperating on 
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Parties may wish to cooperate in literally innumerable legal situations outside 
of litigation: for example, ensuring that mutually beneficial advertising is not 
misleading,70 applying for patents,71 conducting due diligence,72 or avoiding 
any liability in the first place to prevent a lawsuit.73  Courts have regularly 
recognized that the common interest privilege serves the same purpose as the 
underlying privilege: “the free flow of communication to enhance the quality 
of legal advice.”74 
The common interest privilege is the most evolved of these doctrines 
discussed because it allows for separate counsel, like joint defense, whilst 
looking beyond litigation to allow collaboration in any legal matter, as with co-
client privilege.75  It is not a surprise that a Delaware court recently concluded, 
perhaps a bit strongly, that “[a]lthough the common interest doctrine has its 
origin in the joint defense privilege, it has completely replaced that privilege 
for information sharing among clients with different attorneys.”76  There 
remains a place for joint defense where parties to a case want to coordinate 
strategies without necessarily proceeding in the lockstep demanded by a 
common interest.77  In practice, however, common interest should apply to the 
substantial majority of valid multi-party privilege postures.78 
To be sure, some courts and state codes demand that, like joint defense, 
common interest can arise only where litigation is impending or pending.79  
                                                                                                                 
common elements of interest”); see also Pampered Chef, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 965 n.5 (finding 
retention of a single attorney unnecessary to common interest). 
 70. E.g., LG Elecs. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08 C 242, 2009 WL 3294800, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 24, 2009). 
 71. E.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 72. See generally Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45. 
 73. E.g., United States v. BDO Seidelman LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Applying the common interest doctrine to the full range of communications otherwise protected 
by the attorney-client privilege encourages parties with a shared legal interest to seek legal 
‘assistance in order to meet legal requirements and to plan their conduct’ . . . this planning serves 
the public interest by advancing compliance with the law . . . .”); Regents, 101 F.3d at 1390–91; 
see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976) (“Corporations should 
be encouraged to seek legal advice in planning their affairs to avoid litigation as well as in 
pursuing it.”). 
 74. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 62 & n.41. 
 75. See id. at 57–62. 
 76. In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. Del. 2010). 
 77. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1965). 
 78. See Fischer, supra note 25, at 652 (implying a broad application of the common interest 
privilege, limited by the qualifiying principle that “information shared must be for the purpose of 
furthering the legal interests of the members of the arrangement). Cf. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 
881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 79. E.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (“A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose . . . 
confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client . . . by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the 
lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action 
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Such an approach mirrors that of the model Uniform Rules of Evidence.80  A 
litigation requirement would dramatically restrict the scope of the common 
interest privilege, or at least incite parties to contrive attenuated post hoc 
theories of having anticipated some litigation that eventually ensued.81  The 
intertwining of the common interest privilege with litigation may have its roots 
in the earlier joint defense privilege; similarly, some courts’ misconception that 
common interest can apply only to co-clients confuses the modern privilege 
with a predecessor.82  Surreptitiously importing inapposite requirements from 
earlier privileges makes little sense and only serves to blur lines that should be 
clear. 
The better and more prevalent argument, both amongst commentators and in 
the courts, is that parties should be permitted to privily consult counsel 
together whenever they have an identity of interest.83  (Indeed, some courts 
would allow very similar but not identical interests to suffice, despite the fact 
that the parties may later be adverse.84)  This approach has been adopted by 
                                                                                                                 
and concerning a matter of common interest therein . . . .”) (emphasis added); HAW. R. EVID. 
503(b)(3); ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.D. R. 
EVID. 502(b)(3); TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 
272 F.3d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 2001); see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 74–75. 
 80. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
RULES OF EVIDENCE ACT 32-34 (amended 2005); see also Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 
41 (“Other states have adopted a statutory form of the joint defense doctrine based on Uniform 
Rule of Evidence 502(b), which requires pending litigation for the doctrine to apply.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 715–16. 
 82. See Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Schaffzin, 
supra note 7, at 58–62; EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 276 (“The ‘common interest exception’ arose 
in the criminal context where separate counsel for multiple defendants aligned possible defenses 
or at least discussed their litigations strategy.”). 
 83. E.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974); 
see also Fischer, supra note 25, at 634 (“This Article will examine the common interest 
arrangement and whether preserving the confidentiality of information-sharing arrangements 
should be restricted to matters in litigation. I believe that no valid reasons exist for such a 
limitation as long as our legal system continues to recognize the underlying privilege itself.”); 
Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 76–78 (explaining why “jurisdictions should uniformly reject the 
limitation of the common interest doctrine to pending or anticipated litigation”); EPSTEIN, supra 
note 11, at 275 (“There is no need for parties to be allied in a given litigation although it often is 
the case that they are.  What is essential is that their legal interests be fully aligned.”). 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979); In re 
Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. Del. 2010) (“The privilege applies where the 
interests of the parties are not identical, and it applies even where the parties’ interests are adverse 
in substantial respects. The privilege applies even where a lawsuit is foreseeable in the future 
between the co-defendants.”); GUS Consulting GMBH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 
539, 541–42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (“Although some federal courts have held that the doctrine 
applies only where the nature of the parties’ common interest is ‘identical, not similar’. . .  other 
courts, ‘[i]n recognizing the exigencies of the joint-defense privilege . . . have not required a total 
identity of interest among the participants. The privilege applies when a limited common purpose 
necessitates disclosure to certain parties. Thus, even where a later lawsuit is foreseeable between 
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statute in Delaware, the nation’s bellwether of corporate law.85  It has been 
endorsed in the Third Restatement.86  And it has been recommended by the 
Supreme Court.87  The Federal Rules of Evidence Manual recognizes its role in 
upholding privilege’s basic purpose: “In many cases, it is necessary for clients 
to pool information in order to obtain effective representation.  So, to 
encourage information pooling, the common interest rule treats all involved 
attorneys and clients as a single attorney-client unit, at least insofar as a 
common interest is pursued.”88  Free of a litigation requirement, parties may 
properly maintain privilege on one discrete matter while pursuing divergent 
strategies elsewhere.89  In extraordinary cases, privilege may apply even as 
companies secretly and separately prepare claims against one another.90 
This is not to say that the presence or absence of litigation has no bearing on 
the question of common interest.  Mutual business and commercial interests, 
regardless of similarity, cannot suffice for the common interest privilege,91 just 
                                                                                                                 
the co-defendants[,] that does not prevent them from sharing confidential information for the 
purpose of a common interest.’”) (citations omitted); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 70–71 (“Thus, 
sharing parties may overcome even significant adversities between them if the interests for which 
the parties shared the information are identical and they can demonstrate that they exchanged the 
communications with the reasonable expectation that the communications would remain 
confidential.”). 
 85. See DEL. UNIFORM R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
 86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 
2000) (“If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are 
represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a 
communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under sections 68–72 that 
relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons.”).  But see sources cited supra note 40 
and accompanying text. 
 87. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 
F.R.D. 315, 361–62 (1971). 
 88. 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 599 (6th ed. 1994); 
see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 51. 
 89. Leslie, 437 B.R. at 497; e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir. 
1985); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 111–12 (D. Conn. 1997); 330 
Acquisition Co. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 783 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 90. See, e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (“Eureka assuredly was concealing from CTI its consideration of legal action against 
the latter . . . . Wigmore’s first principle presupposes that the communication at issue was made in 
the course of the attorney’s joint representation of a ‘common interest’ of the two parties.  Here, 
although Fried, Frank was representing Eureka and CTI in a matter of common interest at the 
time the communications at issue were made, those communications were not made in the course 
of its representation on that matter; indeed, they were made in the course of representation 
distinctly not in the interest of CTI.”). 
 91. E.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The development 
of defenses to allegations against Aramony simply is not a legal matter concerning UWA.  
Although these defenses could help preserve UWA’s reputation, the preservation of one’s 
reputation is not a legal matter.  If the allegations concerning Aramony could have subjected 
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as they cannot suffice for the attorney-client or work product privileges.92  The 
pendency of a lawsuit surely helps to segregate the legal from the lay.93  
However, the ease of administration cannot abridge the privilege itself,94 and 
there is far more to the legal profession than litigation.95  Indeed, some subjects 
may present both business and legal questions, and the existence or overlap of 
commercial concerns does not and should not foreclose privilege as to the legal 
aspects.96  And from a normative perspective, the law should not dissuade 
                                                                                                                 
UWA to civil or criminal liability, Aramony’s claim would be stronger.”); John Doe Corp. v. 
United States, 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982); Rayman v. Am. Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 654 (D. Neb. 1993); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 
1146, 1167 (D.S.C. 1974); see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 72 (“Courts also require that the 
common interest shared by the parties be a legal, rather than a purely commercial, interest.”); see 
also Mineaba Co. v. Pabst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Bank Brussels Lambert v. 
Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & 
Eagan, supra note 45, at 353–54 (considering the question of legal interest in due diligence). 
 92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. c (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2000) (extending privilege to communication for the purpose of legal advice and “not 
predominantly for another purpose.”); see, e.g., W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 
F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991) (“Attorney-client communications concerning business matters are not 
within the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 93. See Tr. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 
266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“There is no clearer example of when the privilege is protected 
than in this case, where the transferor and transferee are engaged in related litigation against a 
common adversary on the same issue or issues.”); Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 
F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004) (looking to whether litigation was anticipated in assessing 
whether asserted common interest was business or legal); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 
508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976) (“The timing and setting of the communications are important 
indicators of the measure of common interest; the shared interest necessary to justify extending 
the privilege to encompass intercorporate communications appears most clearly in cases of co-
defendants and impending litigations but is not necessarily limited to those situations.”); see also 
Fischer, supra note 25, at 642; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing common interest in the 
context of the litigation requirement). 
 94. Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“While it would probably be 
more convenient for the Government to secure the results of petitioner’s internal investigation by 
simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner’s attorneys, such 
considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client 
privilege.”). 
 95. See SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 513 (“The [common interest] privilege need not be limited 
to legal consultations between corporations in litigation situations, however.”). 
 96. E.g., In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 & n.9 (Bankr. Del. 2010) (“The fact 
that there may be an overlap of a commercial and a legal interest for a third party does not negate 
the effect of the legal interest in establishing a community of interest.”); accord Strougo v. BEA 
Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. 
Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“While the lenders’ business interests may 
coincide or overlap with their legal interests, the obligations they seek to enforce are grounded in 
contract and, by definition, involve the pursuit of legal rights and remedies.”); Cheeves v. S. 
Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 130 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. 
Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1975). Contra, e.g., Bank Brussels Lambert, 160 F.R.D. at 447 (“[T]he 
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clients—whether singular or multiple—from soliciting legal advice that 
encourages adherence to rule of law and preserves judicial resources by 
avoiding lawsuits entirely.97 
The co-client, joint defense, and common interest privileges are thus best 
seen as forming an incompletely overlapping Venn diagram.98  The following 
table summarizes the best view of each of the doctrines hitherto discussed: 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Multiple-Party Privileges 
 CO-CLIENT   JOINT DEFENSE 
COMMON 
INTEREST 
NO. OF CLIENTS multiple multiple multiple 
SHARED COUNSEL? shared separate separate 
LITIGATION 
REQUIREMENT? 
no yes no 
IDENTICAL INTEREST?99 yes no yes 
 
As can be seen, the common interest relationship is a complement to co-
client privilege, allowing clients to choose between mutual (co-client) and 
separate (common interest) representation in any matter in which they have 
identical interests.100  By contrast, joint defense is somewhat different, in that it 
requires an underlying litigation against which to jointly defend, but allows 
greater leeway in variance of tactics once that fundamental alignment of 
interests is established.101  The community of interest in joint defense is 
                                                                                                                 
common interest doctrine does not encompass a joint business strategy which happens to include 
as one of its elements a concern about litigation.”). 
 97. See United States v. BDO Seidelman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 98. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Leslie 
Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. Del. 2010); see also supra Section I.A. 
 99. As mentioned above, some courts would find very similar but not identical interests 
sufficient.  See supra note 84.  For the purposes of these distinctions, “identical” will be used to 
encompass both standards. 
 100. See  Fischer, supra note 25, at 638–39 (“The common interest arrangement represents 
an interpretation of the attorney-client privilege that avoids forcing defendants to elect between 
either common counsel, with the associated ‘conflicts of interests’ such representation presents, 
or separate counsel, with its cost of forfeiting the confidentiality of the shared information.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) 
(“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs from the co-
client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”). 
 101. See GUS Consulting GmbH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539, 541–42 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008) ( “[I]n recognizing the exigencies of the joint-defense privilege, [courts] 
have not required a total identity of interest among the participants.”); accord In re Megan-Racine 
Assocs., Inc., 189 B.R. 562, 572 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET 
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.03 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court 
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circumscribed by the litigation; in common interest, it is bounded by the 
identical stratagem pursued.102  The burdens imposed on the privilege’s 
proponent also differ sharply.103  Co-clients are established based on traditional 
principles of legal retention;104 codefendants might present a docket sheet as 
predicate for joint defense;105 but putative parties in common interest must 
show their strategies actually coincide.106  Though intimately related, each has 
a place in the protection of both professional representation and the broader 
adversarial system, the central concerns of the attorney-client, and work 
product privileges respectively.107 
                                                                                                                 
Standard 503, lawyer-client privilege); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir. 
1985) (citing United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979)); Hunydee v. 
United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 
F.2d 347, 349–50 (9th Cir. 1964).  As previously mentioned, one can speak imprecisely of a 
“joint-defense” relationship in which clients share the same counsel, but the requirements of such 
arrangements reduce to that of co-client, owing to the ethical and practical impossibility of 
representing adverse clients.  Compare supra text supported by note 62, with text supported by 
note 63. 
 102. See generally supra Section I.A. 
 103. Cf. United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating in the common 
interest context that “a party asserting a privilege exemption . . . bears the burden of 
demonstrating its applicability.”) (quoting In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 
2001)); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 63 n.43 (“As with all evidentiary privileges, the burden of 
proof is on the party seeking to apply the common interest doctrine.”). 
 104. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 528 (“In the joint client representation scenario, a 
heightened requirement of common interest is not necessary. The common interest is inherent in 
the nature of the representation. As long as the communication is in the context of the joint 
representation and as long as it satisfies the other elements of the attorney-client privilege, then 
the communication should enjoy the privilege.”); e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title 
Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 936–37 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F. 
Supp. 828, 830–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  Compare Sky Valley Lts. P’ship v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., 
150 F.R.D. 648, 652–53 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing eleven factors for determining co-client status) 
with EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 281 (citing six factors). 
 105. See generally Stephen A. Messer and Scott J. Seagle, Combining Forces: A Primer on 
the Joint Defense Agreement in Civil Litigation, 30 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 7–8 (2011) (explaining 
that courts have often afforded the joint defense privilege to codefendants by virtue of their 
participation in a common defense); see also RICE, supra note  2, § 4:35 at 260 & n.37 (“[S]ome 
courts have assumed this intention [of furthering a joint defense] when the parties are 
codefendants or prospective codefendants.”) (citing cases). 
 106. See FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Thus, the proponent of 
the exception must establish cooperation in fact toward the achievement of a common 
objective.”); In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. Del. 2010); see also United 
States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 107. Ogden, 202 F.3d at 461. 
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B.  Privilege Amongst Competitors and Combinations 
The antitrust and merger contexts present special challenges for corporate 
common interest.108  Market rivals clearly cannot be allowed to conceal 
anticompetitive collusion behind a fig leaf of putative common interest, which 
would impermissibly co-opt the shield of privilege for violations of the law.109  
Competitors who claim their interests coincide inherently raise a certain 
quantum of suspicion.110  To use a recurring example, claims of mutual 
privilege proponed by competing members conferring under the umbrella of a 
trade association have yielded a diversity of holdings: some older decisions 
favored viewing members as co-clients of the association’s lawyers, but more 
modern courts typically reject that presumption as unwieldy and unwarranted, 
and demand a specific showing that the competitors mutually sought legal 
counsel in the matter under dispute.111  Whether this then places the various 
members in a common interest privilege stance, or merely confirms their status 
as co-agents or co-clients, remains largely unclear from the cases.112 
                                                 
 108. See Anne King, Comment, The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures during 
Negotiations for Substantial Transactions, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1412–13 (2007) (stating that 
“most courts conclude that disclosures made during transaction negotiations work a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, and thus courts decline to allow common interest protection. But a few 
courts hold that disclosures during negotiations for a substantial transaction may be protected 
under the common interest doctrine. Hence, with respect to substantial transactions, courts are 
split as to whether common interest protection applies to disclosures made during negotiations.”). 
See generally Schomig, supra note 40. 
 109. See Gregory B. Mauldin, Invoking the Common Interest Privilege in Collaborative 
Business Ventures, 56 FED. LAW 54, 58 (2009); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 
383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (voicing concern over extending privilege to antitrust matters due to 
the likelihood of abuse, and inadequate regulatory measures); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 277 
(“The greatest push to expand the common interest privilege comes from corporate attorneys 
representing multiple clients often in an antitrust context.  It is precisely in such a context that the 
potential for abuse is the greatest.  The ‘common interest’ privilege may be nothing but a cover 
for an antitrust conspiracy.”); cf. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword.”). 
 110. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 514 (D. Conn. 1976) (directing 
proponent of privilege as to common interest in antitrust consultations with competitor to submit 
affidavit of the content of the discussions to the court for in camera inspection, noting that the 
“individual postures relevant to the antitrust discussions in point are undefined”). See supra note 
109 and accompanying text. 
 111. Compare Schomig, supra note 40, at 10 (“Several older trial court opinions have, with 
little analysis, held that all members of a trade association enjoy an attorney-client relationship 
with the association’s legal counsel.”), with id. at 10–11 (“Some more recent court decisions have 
analyzed the privilege status of attorney-client communications made between trade association 
members and the association’s attorney in a manner that takes into account many factors 
governing both the general nature of the attorney-member relationship and the circumstances 
surrounding the particular communications at issue.”). 
 112. Schomig, supra note 40, at 10–11. 
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Antitrust concerns were discussed at length in the Fifth Circuit’s decision to 
deny common interest privilege to competitors in In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp,113 
in which privilege was sought on a memorandum on labor law circulated 
amongst several offshore drilling companies.114  In demurring, the court 
expressed serious fears about according privilege to market rivals who might 
well be engaging in price fixing or other antitrust violations.115  To be sure, 
under the crime-fraud doctrine, no privilege could apply to exchanges 
constituting antitrust (or any other) legal infractions.116  The panel majority’s 
holding is troubling, however, insofar as it prescribes an especially severe 
litigation requirement: 
In the present case, Santa Fe admits in the motion for reconsideration 
it filed in the district court that the communications it claims are 
protected by the privilege were not made in anticipation of future 
litigation.  Instead, the documents were “circulated for the purpose of 
ensuring compliance with the antitrust laws and minimizing any 
potential risk associated with the exchange of wage and benefit 
information.” In sharing the communications, therefore, they sought 
to avoid conduct that might lead to litigation. They were not 
preparing for future litigation.117 
Given the opinion’s stated concerns, such reasoning seems perverse, penalizing 
companies whose recourse to counsel was to avoid violation of antitrust laws.  
Yet the majority was nonchalant as to any policy concerns stemming from 
providing disincentives for companies to mutually ensure their behavior is 
legal.118  It was left to the dissent to forcefully, if futilely, expound the better 
                                                 
 113. 272 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 114. Id. at 709. 
 115. Id. at 714 (“[T]he record in this case is neither clear nor indisputable with respect to 
Santa Fe’s motive for sending its inhouse counsel’s memorandum to its horizontal offshore 
drilling competitors. It is possible that the disclosures were made to facilitate future price fixing 
in violation of the antitrust laws, as the plaintiffs contend.”); see also id. at 711 (holding “there 
must be a palpable threat of litigation at the time of the communication, rather than a mere 
awareness that one’s questionable conduct might some day [sic] result in litigation, before 
communications between one possible future co-defendant and another, such as the ones here 
made between one horizontal competitor and another, could qualify for protection”). 
 116. See id. at 714 n.9 (“If so, they would fall outside the scope of any attorney-client 
privilege as communications made for criminal or fraudulent purposes.”); Duplan Corp v. 
Deering Milliken, Inc, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1196–97 (D.S.C. 1974) (finding that a “prima facie 
showing of an antitrust violation establishes the tort exception to the attorney-client privilege, 
requiring production of all confidential communications that show the opinions of the associates’ 
attorneys”); see also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563–64 (1989) (providing an 
explanation of the crime-fraud exception); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). 
 117. Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 713. 
 118. Id. at 714 (“There is no justification within the reasonable bounds of the attorney-client 
privilege for horizontal competitors to exchange legal information, which allegedly contains 
confidences, in the absence of an actual, or imminent, or at least directly foreseeable, lawsuit. . . . 
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holding: “the parties claiming protection under the rule only need share ‘a 
common legal interest’ about a matter, and there need be no actual litigation in 
progress.”119 
In any event, the Fifth Circuit’s approach to common interest is distinctly 
ungenerous compared to its sister circuits.120  Other courts have had little doubt 
that competitors “shared a common legal interest regarding compliance with 
antitrust and other laws.”121  Society’s interest in promoting lawful behavior is 
paramount, and “manifestly does not require that there be actual or 
contemplated litigation.  Indeed, in response to the explosion of regulations 
from federal and state agencies, business entities routinely seek the advice of 
lawyers precisely so that they may avoid litigation by planning for the 
future.”122  Such concerns are at their zenith in the antitrust setting, given that 
attorneys are the primary actors ensuring corporate compliance.123  Without 
competent counsel capable of consulting confidentially with their counterparts, 
companies cannot be expected to discern the delicate bounds that define 
antitrust law.124  And, vexingly, the continued “undifferentiated use” of the 
terms “joint defense” and “common interest” to describe legal arrangements 
involving separate counsel has only exacerbated the uncertainty of whether 
privilege attaches in these situations.125 
                                                                                                                 
[If] the disclosures were perhaps made in the sole interest of preventing future antitrust violations, 
as the defendants argue in their motion for reconsideration, . . . they hardly could be seen as the 
commencement of an allied litigation effort.”). 
 119. Id. at 719 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 
768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985), United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir.1986), and 
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 120. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 357 (“In the Fifth Circuit, the 
two types of communications protected under the common interest doctrine are: (1) 
communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their counsel, and (2) 
communications between potential co-defendants and their counsel.  These oft-cited categories of 
protected communications are quite narrow when compared to the limits established in other 
circuits, and thus district courts in this circuit may arguably be reluctant to extend the common 
interest doctrine any further.”); see also Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 719–20. 
 121. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 122. Id. at 416; cf. supra text supported by note 9. 
 123. Duplan Corp v. Deering Milliken, Inc, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974) (“This 
court recognizes that it is not the federal government that is primarily responsible for enforcement 
of the federal antitrust laws but rather the lawyers who advise their corporate clients. Unless 
corporate personnel on a fairly low level can speak to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of 
the federal antitrust laws is likely to be adversely affected.”). 
 124. See id.; see also In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It is often prior 
to the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped either to help clients avoid 
litigation or to strengthen available defenses should litigation occur.  For instance, lawyers 
routinely . . . consider whether business decisions might result in antitrust or securities 
lawsuits.”); supra text supported by note 9. 
 125. In re Sulfuric Acid, 235 F.R.D. at 417. 
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A New York appellate court recently sorted through some of these 
considerations thoughtfully in Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc.126   That New York was the venue reflects it being the domiciliary 
state of many corporations, as well as its high court’s thoughtful parsing of 
common law.127  The factual setting was the archetypal corporate 
collaboration: materials shared between companies undertaking a merger and 
its attendant legal complexities.128  At issue were hundreds of documents 
shared during pre-merger discussions that the trial court had ordered produced, 
finding that “that the common-interest rule, an exception to the attorney-client 
privilege, does not apply unless the parties share a common legal interest that 
impacts potential litigation involving all parties, and that to hold otherwise 
would be inconsistent with the narrow scope of the attorney-client 
privilege.”129  After reviewing contrary authority, the appellate panel 
disagreed: 
We find, however, that this line of cases does not adequately address 
the specific situation presented here: two business entities, having 
signed a merger agreement without contemplating litigation, and 
having signed a confidentiality agreement, required the shared advice 
of counsel in order to accurately navigate the complex legal and 
regulatory process involved in completing the transaction.  As BAC 
aptly asserts, imposing a litigation requirement in this scenario 
discourages parties with a shared legal interest, such as the signed 
merger agreement here, from seeking and sharing that advice, and 
would inevitably result instead in the onset of regulatory or private 
litigation because of the parties’ lack of sound guidance from 
counsel.  This outcome would make poor legal as well as poor 
business policy.130 
Accordingly, the court rejected the litigation requirement and instead adopted 
the better rule that privilege is not forfeited so long as the parties to the 
attorney-client communication share a common legal interest.131 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed in a fractured 4-2 
decision.132  The majority ruled against a backdrop of twenty years during 
                                                 
 126. 998 N.Y.S.2d 329 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. 
June 9, 2016). 
 127. See David E. Bland & Scott G. Johnson, Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to 
Investigations Involving Attorneys: What Is Fair Game in Discovery?, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 32–33 (2d ed. 1997). 
 128. Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 331–32. 
 129. Id. at 332. 
 130. Id. at 336–37. 
 131. Id. at 337. 
 132. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 
1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016). 
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which New York courts had “restricted the common interest doctrine to 
pending or anticipated litigation,” declining the invitation to expand the 
privilege further in light of modern developments.133  In particular, the 
majority fretted that untethering common interest privilege from litigation 
would render it unadministrable and prone to abuse,134 and opined that its 
litigation requirement had occasioned no “corporate crisis” in merger practice 
during those twenty years.135  The dissent, by contrast, adopted much of the 
appellate panel’s reasoning, emphasizing that the attorney-client privilege has 
no litigation requirement itself, promoting the free flow of information 
between client and counsel,136 and that encouraging privilege in the merger 
context could only support companies’ compliance with the law.137  It rejected 
as speculative any potential for abuse, noting robust protections deriving from 
the crime-fraud doctrine and requirement of legal rather than commercial 
commonality.138  And it noted that eschewing a litigation requirement would 
have brought New York into synchrony with many other state and federal 
jurisdictions.139 
Indeed, the appellate panel in Ambac had observed that its rule has been 
widely adopted in the federal courts, calling it the “federal approach,”140 
echoing other courts that have noted that “federal case law makes clear that the 
common interest doctrine applies even where there is no litigation in 
progress.”141  This is no exaggeration: the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits have all rejected a strict litigation 
requirement,142 while only the Fifth has embraced it.143  As mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
 133. Id. at *18. 
 134. Id. at *18–19. 
 135. Id. at *18. 
 136. Id. at *25–26 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at *38–40. 
 138. Id. at *39–40. 
 139. Id. at *10 & n.1. 
 140. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 334–35 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016). (“Neither this 
Court nor the Court of Appeals has yet considered the propriety of a litigation requirement for the 
common-interest privilege. However, the federal courts that have addressed the issue have 
overwhelmingly rejected that requirement.”). 
 141. HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 71 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 142. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F.Supp.2d 52, 60 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting the 
Restatement that common interest applies to both “a litigated or unlitigated matter”); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 
243–44 (2d Cir. 1989) (It is “unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress for the 
common interest rule of the attorney-client privilege to apply.”); In re Teleglobe Comm’ns Corp, 
493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ommunity-of-interest privilege . . . applies in civil and 
criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”); United States v. Aramony, 88 
F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“But it is unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress 
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the Supreme Court itself has proposed a federal rule of common interest 
without any such requirement.144  One court of appeals even upheld common 
interest between parties to a merger that eventually collapsed, leaving them 
adversaries in the ensuing legal action.145  Such jurisprudential concord is vital 
to companies contemplating combinations,146 where mutual discussions with 
antitrust counsel are often undertaken.147  Imposing a litigation requirement 
inefficiently exposes merging companies to potentially protracted discovery 
rather than encouraging them to forestall a lawsuit entirely.148  The irony that 
Ambac points to is that a litigation requirement for common interest would 
increase the risk of those very suits.149 
On the other hand, more latitude may be afforded by work product privilege.  
Some courts have recognized the assessment of potential antitrust litigation 
occasioned by a merger as sufficiently concrete to qualify as being prepared 
                                                                                                                 
for this privilege to apply.”); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“[C]ommunications need not be made in anticipation of litigation to fall within the 
common interest doctrine.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (quoting the Restatement that common interest applies to both “a litigated or 
nonlitigated matter”); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(Common interest applies “irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated.”); In re Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Common interest “is not limited to 
actions taken and advice obtained in the shadow of litigation.”). 
 143. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 714–16 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 144. See supra note 87.  However, Congress declined to codify the privilege and instead 
directed federal courts to apply traditional common law. See FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 145. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). 
 146. See, e.g., In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Securities Litig., No. 06-CV-4674, 2007 WL 
2363311, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[A]fter the parties to the merger signed the merger 
agreement, they shared a common interest in ensuring that the newly agreed merger met any 
regulatory conditions and achieved shareholder approval.”); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 
No. CL 81833, 2002 WL 34217931 (Ia. Dist. Ct. April 15, 2002) ( “The Purchaser and Director 
Defendants’ common interest began with the execution of the merger agreement. From this point 
forward, . . . they had a common interest - legal strategies for seeking regulatory approval and 
discussions relating to the joint defense of this lawsuit - in effectuating the merger agreement. . . . 
communications prepared in reference to regulatory approval after the merger agreement was 
executed are protected.”). 
 147. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336–37 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016); see also 
Kathryn M. Fenton, Conflict and Ethics Issues Arising from Joint Defense/Common Interest 
Relationships, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Dec. 2009) (“It is common for companies under 
investigation for possible cartel activities to enter into a JDA [joint defense agreement] to 
facilitate fact gathering and development of a coordinated strategy. Similar interests might 
motivate formation of common interest groups in merger reviews or civil antitrust lawsuits.”). 
 148. See Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296.  But see Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 149 (“Parties co-
operating in conjunction with a business transaction, such as a merger or business deal, are not 
necessarily pursuing a common or joint defense.”). 
 149. Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 337. 
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“because of” litigation, and thus within the work product privilege.150  Their 
reasoning is straightforward: to permit discovery of such an assessment would 
flout the very concerns central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the work 
product privilege in Hickman v. Taylor: “asked by a client to evaluate the 
antitrust implications of a proposed merger and advised that no specific claim 
had yet surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected would not 
likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum assessing the merger’s 
weaknesses.”151  Even when competitors are collaborating towards a common 
end, claims of common interest in work product may find a more sympathetic 
ear because of the work product privilege’s built-in nexus to litigation.152 
II.  SOME COMMON MISSTEPS ANENT COMMON INTEREST IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
Yet for all its ubiquity elsewhere, the federal approach—that is, rejection of 
the litigation requirement in the attorney-client common interest context—has 
enjoyed unsettled application in a vital jurisdiction for merging companies, the 
D.C. Circuit, where antitrust actions are often filed and precedent is made.153  
No circuit has been immune from some degree of confusion about common 
interest.154  But the district courts in the D.C. Circuit have generated a notably 
disjointed corpus of precedent,155 with some imposing a litigation requirement 
and others not.  Broadly speaking, the lack of cohesion has two wellsprings.  
The first and more fundamental flows from gauzy treatment of the divergent 
rationales for common interest in maintaining work product privilege on the 
one hand, and the attorney-client privilege on the other.156  The second arises 
from conflation of modern common interest doctrine with its conceptual 
forebears in the joint defense or even co-client privilege.157  Where these 
currents of confusion have intersected, the law of common interest has become 
                                                 
 150. See e.g., In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 151. Id. at 886 (proceeding to explain how such a situation would defy Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947): “Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing, note-taking, and 
communications so critical to effective legal thinking would, in Hickman’s words, ‘demoraliz[e]’ 
the legal profession, and ‘the interests  of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly 
served.’”). 
 152. See Schomig, supra note 40, at 12–13. 
 153. See Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 UTAH L. 
REV. 741, 741 (2006) (“In this brief comment, I will use the debate over the enduring meaning of 
Microsoft to argue that the D.C. Circuit has surpassed the United States Supreme Court as the 
most important and articulate antitrust court and has outshone the highest court in the land in 
crafting honest and true antitrust doctrine consistent with history, precedent, and policy.”). 
 154. See generally Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45 (discussing common 
interest concerns in each circuit). 
 155. Take, for example, the despondent sentiment expressed in the epigram to this Article by 
one of those district courts in Miller v. Holzmann. 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 156. See infra Section II.A. 
 157. See infra Section II.B. 
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a hazardous morass for companies seeking surety for their secrecy.158  Such 
confusion is all the more perplexing—and readily resoluble—given the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that point to consistent answers.159 
A.  Work-Product Versus Attorney-Client Privilege 
Some of the entanglement originates from the oft-cited decision of the D.C. 
Circuit in United States v. AT&T.160  MCI, a litigant in a separate antitrust suit 
against AT&T, had disclosed documents subject to work product privilege to 
the United States, and attempted to intervene in the government’s case to 
defend its privilege, but the district court denied both intervention and work 
product protection.161  The court of appeals then reversed, finding MCI’s 
intervention mandatory,162 and upholding MCI’s work product claims despite 
the disclosure to the government, citing the common interest doctrine: 
We do not endorse a reading of the GAF Corp. standard so broad as 
to allow confidential disclosure to any person without waiver of the 
work product privilege.  The existence of common interests between 
transferor and transferee is relevant to deciding whether the 
disclosure is consistent with the nature of the work product privilege.  
But “common interests” should not be construed as narrowly limited 
to co-parties.  So long as transferor and transferee anticipate 
litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues, 
they have strong common interests in sharing the fruit of the trial 
preparation efforts.163 
By its terms, the AT&T court’s holding on common interest was therefore 
cabined to the work product privilege, which presupposes adversarial 
litigation.164  Indeed, the court grounded its holding in the starkly contrasting 
purposes of attorney-client and work product privileges, observing that the 
“purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect information against 
opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a particular confidential 
relationship, in order to encourage effective trial preparation.”165  Common 
interest in the work product context is inherently and unobjectionably tethered 
                                                 
 158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312–13 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(engaging in both misapprehensions). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 29 
F.3d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). 
 160. Am. Tel. & Tel., 642 F.2d at 1299–1300. 
 161. Id. at 1288. 
 162. Id. at 1295. 
 163. Id. at 1299. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
858 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:833 
to the lawsuit that animates the work product privilege itself.166  Work product 
applies only to documents created “because of” litigation.167  To be sure, the 
D.C. Circuit has recognized that work product privilege may attach in advance 
of the lawsuit being filed, or based on work to avoid legal action on a 
particular claim.168  The requisite “eye toward litigation” may be attenuated, 
but there must still be a nexus.169  Modern attorney-client privilege, by 
contrast, undeniably has no litigation requirement whatsoever.170 
The problem arose when lower courts later mistakenly cited to AT&T for 
common interest reasoning in the wholly different posture of the attorney-
client privilege, even though the court of appeals had distinguished it 
sharply.171  The first such case, Holland v. Island Creek Corp.,172 cited AT&T 
alone for the proposition that “[u]nder the common interest rule, individuals 
may share information without waiving the attorney-client privilege if: (1) the 
disclosure is made due to actual or anticipated litigation . . . .”173  Others courts 
in the D.C. Circuit followed apace.174  Some selectively quoted AT&T as to the 
litigation requirement whilst trimming away the holding’s limitation to the 
work product privilege.175  Inexorably, district courts came to be citing their 
                                                 
 166. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The work product privilege 
protects any material obtained or prepared by a lawyer ‘in the course of his legal duties, provided 
that the work was done with an eye toward litigation.’”) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 
793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 
864 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 167. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that most 
circuits apply the “because of” standard to work product). 
 168. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 169. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 718 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809). 
 170. See Welles, supra note 57, at 325–26 (“The attorney-client privilege currently extends 
to any communication made in order to facilitate the rendition of legal services to a client, 
‘irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated’”) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2294–
95); see also Spectrum Sys. Int’l. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 1991) 
(“The prospect of litigation may be relevant to the subject of work product and trial preparation 
materials, but the attorney-client privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation.”). 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 164–65; see also United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 172. 885 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 173. Id. at 6. 
 174. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. Civ.99-
329, 2004 WL 2009413, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004) (“Parties may successfully operate under 
the common interest privilege if the communication: 1) is prompted by actual or anticipated 
litigation . . . .”). 
 175. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 303 F.R.D. 419, 427 
(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299–1300 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980)) (“A common interest privilege can exist ‘so long as [the] transferor and transferee 
anticipate litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues.’”); see also Miller v. 
Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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own colleagues’ holdings,176 creating a false impression of consensus about 
common interest based on a single mistaken predicate. 
Perhaps, this is partly the result of the passage of time since the AT&T 
decision; the earliest of these misconstructions was issued in 1995, fifteen 
years after the original holding.177  One district court even recognized that 
AT&T spoke only to common interest in the work product privilege, but 
nonetheless assumed “that the common interest rule is equally applicable” to 
attorney-client privilege, whilst noting “it is possible that the precise scope of 
the common interest rule will vary as applied to each privilege because of the 
differing purposes of the privileges.”178  Another also conceded AT&T’s basis 
in work product theory, yet still found the holding supports the requirement of 
pending litigation even for the attorney-client privilege.179  The latter court’s 
frustration shows through in the opinion, as when it pronounces, with certain 
hint of resignation, “Suffice to say, it is impossible to conclude that the 
common law, as interpreted in this and other jurisdictions, provides a clear 
explanation of what a common interest is . . . .”180  Such a sentiment is hardly 
original, as many courts and commentators have offered similar laments.181 
Such pessimism, however, discounts the many trial courts and appellate 
panels in the D.C. Circuit that have gotten AT&T right.  Only two years later, 
the court of appeals followed AT&T faithfully in distinguishing the purposes of 
the attorney-client and work product privileges, and quoted its holding on 
common interest only for the latter.182  Subsequent court of appeals decisions 
followed suit.183  And numerous district court decisions have similarly read 
                                                 
 176. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 
Holland, 885 F. Supp. at 6), vacated, 786 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 177. Holland, 885 F. Supp. at 6. 
 178. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 313 n.4 
(D.D.C. 1994). 
 179. See Miller, 240 F.R.D. at 22 (quoting United States v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 
1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (“More to the point, in this Circuit, the court of appeals has 
indicated that the work product privilege is not lost even if it is shared by entities that are not co-
parties in litigation so long as ‘transferor and transferee anticipate litigation against a common 
adversary on the same issue or issues.’ While the court was speaking of the work-product 
privilege, the decision at least points away from any greater requirement than a common interest 
in litigation against a common adversary.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 23, at 551–53; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 51–54. 
 182. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817–18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“We have held that a 
party waives its work product protection in civil litigation if it discloses the privileged material to 
anyone without ‘common interests in developing legal theories and analyses of documents.’”). 
 183. E.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139–40 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As we 
explained in AT&T, the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine serve different 
purposes: the former protects the attorney-client relationship by safeguarding confidential 
communications, whereas the latter promotes the adversary process by insulating an attorney’s 
litigation preparation from discovery.”); United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir. 
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AT&T as speaking only to the work product privilege’s requirement of 
litigation, and clearly differentiated the rationales for assertion and waiver of 
attorney-client privilege.184 
In fairness, AT&T might be read as questioning whether common interest is 
available at all in the attorney-client context, given its emphasis on 
confidentiality.185  At least one district court has thought as much.186  But in 
1994, the court of appeals explained in In re Sealed Case187 that “common 
interest privilege protects communications between a lawyer and two or more 
clients regarding a matter of common interest,” without expressing any 
reservation about litigation.188  (It is inconvenient but unavoidable, given the 
secrecy of the grand jury context in which matters of privilege often arise, that 
the appellate court has decided so many cases anent privilege under the caption 
In re Sealed Case.189) 
                                                                                                                 
2009); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In re 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Tr. of Elec. Workers 
Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(“AT&T was followed in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, where the claim was made 
that the Department of Justice had forfeited its work-product privilege when it disclosed its work-
product in rebutting claims made against it in a Congressional committee report. The court of 
appeals rejected the forfeiture, invoking the AT&T case for the principle that the work-product 
privilege is forfeited only when the disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining the secrecy of the 
work-product from the disclosing party’s adversary.” (citations omitted)). 
 184. E.g., Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 356, 370 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The attorney-client and 
work-product privileges serve different societal interests.”) (quoting Tr. of Elec. Workers, 266 
F.R.D. at 13); In re Apollo Grp. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 12, 23 (D.D.C. 2008); Nishnic v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 671 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Latin Inv. Corp. v. L & L Constr. Assoc., 
Inc., 160 B.R. 262, 263–64 (Bankr. D.C. 1993). 
 185. In re United Mine Workers Of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 312, 313 
n.4 (D.D.C. 1994) (observing without holding that “it is possible to read some language in the 
American Tel. and Tel. case (especially in light of In re Sealed Case) to suggest that the common 
interest rule is inapplicable to situations where information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege is disclosed to a third party because any such disclosure (even to an individual or entity 
with a common interest) would be inconsistent with the confidentiality inherent in the attorney-
client relationship.”); see also United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.D.C. 
1980) (“We do not consider the strict standard of waiver in the attorney-client privilege context, 
as reflected in D’Ippolito, to be appropriate for work product cases. The attorney-client privilege 
exists to protect confidential communications, to assure the client that any statements he makes in 
seeking legal advice will be kept strictly confidential between him and his attorney; in effect, to 
protect the attorney-client relationship. Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege 
is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.”). 
 186. E.g., United Mine Workers, 159 F.R.D. at 313 n.4. 
 187. 29 F.3d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 188. Id. at 719.  Technically, what Sealed Case described was co-client privilege, but the 
court did not distinguish clearly between separate or mutual counsel in the common interest 
context. 
 189. See generally In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 
29 F.3d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re 
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The Holland court’s failure the very next year in 1995 to follow the 
guideposts in Sealed Case, and its choice to instead transplant AT&T’s logic 
regarding work product, is perplexing.190  Nor did the court of appeals view 
AT&T itself as pointing in a different direction; three years after Holland, it 
read AT&T and Sealed Case together as establishing that common interest 
applied not only to work product but also to attorney-client privilege, and again 
omitted any litigation requirement for the latter: “as a usual rule, disclosure of 
attorney-client or work product confidences to third parties waives the 
protection of the relevant privileges; however, when the third party is a lawyer 
whose client shares an overlapping ‘common interest’ with the primary client, 
the privileges may remain intact.”191  Several district courts have found 
common interest may attach in the attorney-client context.192  Whatever the 
source of confusion in other district courts between work product and attorney-
client privilege, the court of appeals has made its own reasoning passably 
clear. 
B.  Joint Defense (and Co-Client) Versus Common Interest Privilege 
Just as district courts in the D.C. Circuit have often confused common 
interest principles in the work product and attorney-client contexts, they have 
also conflated the common interest privilege itself with its predecessor in the 
joint defense privilege.193  And once again, such confusion is puzzling because 
the court of appeals has spoken directly to the issue.194  In Sealed Case, the 
panel clearly recognized and distinguished between discrete joint interest and 
common interest privileges, holding that appellant had properly raised each 
before the lower court and thereby preserved both claims.195  The court 
described joint defense privilege as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  To avoid confusion, references to Sealed Case 
in the main text will be limited to the seminal 1994 decision. 
 190. See Holland v. Island Creek Corp., 885, F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 191. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 192. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d 
66, 74 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The attorney-client common interest privilege ‘protects communications 
between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest.’ It applies to 
both ‘communications subject to the attorney-client privilege’ and ‘communications protected by 
the work-product doctrine.’” (citations omitted)). 
 193. See, e.g., Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 
(D.D.C. 2007); see also United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 194. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718–19 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 195. Id. (“The appellant also argues that the common interest privilege bars disclosure of his 
communications with the Lawyer. Specifically, he contends that he, Z and the foreign company 
share an attorney-client privilege regarding their consultations with the Lawyer. Therefore, he 
argues, any waiver of the privilege that he made was ineffective because a jointly held privilege 
can be waived only by all of its holders. In response, the Government claims that the appellant 
waived his common interest privilege argument by failing to raise it below. We disagree. 
 
862 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:833 
The joint defense privilege protects communications between two or 
more parties and their respective counsel if they are engaged in a 
joint defense effort.  The party asserting the privilege must show: 
“(1) the communications were made in the course of a joint defense 
effort; (2) the statements were designed to further the effort; and (3) 
the privilege has not been waived.”  The district court rejected the 
joint defense privilege because there was no “actual or potential 
litigation” or strong possibility thereof at the time the appellant 
consulted the Lawyer.196 
As with work product, the joint defense privilege by its very terms requires an 
actual or potential litigation against which to jointly defend.197  Not so with the 
distinct common interest privilege, which looks only to sharing a “matter of 
common interest.”198  Indeed, AT&T had only a few years before expressly 
rejected cramped restrictions even in the work product context, finding that 
“‘common interests’ should not be construed as narrowly limited to co-
parties.”199 
Despite this critical difference, district courts in the D.C. Circuit have 
regularly conflated the two and thereby imported the joint defense litigation 
requirement into the common interest privilege.200  The first such case, United 
States v. Hsia,201 enigmatically cites directly to Sealed Case for the proposition 
that the “joint defense privilege, often referred to as the common interest rule, 
is an extension of the attorney-client privilege that protects from forced 
disclosure communications between two or more parties and/or their respective 
counsel if they are participating in a joint defense agreement.”202  Such an 
equation of the two privileges cannot be found in Sealed Case, yet Hsia’s gloss 
has proven influential.  It was quoted wholesale in United States v. Phillip 
Morris203 and Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.,204 the latter of 
which was in turn cited in NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp.205 for the 
                                                                                                                 
Although the Government is correct in noting that the appellant concentrated his argument on the 
joint defense privilege in district court, he also asserted the common interest privilege.”). 
 196. Id. at 719 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 197. See id.; United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 198. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719; cf. Holland v. Island Creek Corp., 885 F. Supp. 4 
(D.D.C. 1995). 
 199. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  Work 
product still requires litigation, but as discussed above, the putative parties in joint defense were 
litigants in separate but related litigations.  Id. at 1288–90. 
 200. E.g., United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2000); Minebea Co., Ltd. v. 
Papst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 201. 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 7 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 202. Id. at 16 (referencing In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 719 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
 203. No. Civ. A. 99-2496(GK), 2004 WL 5355972, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2004). 
 204. 471 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 205. 257 F.R.D. 302, 302 (D.D.C. 2009), vacated, 786 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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observation that the “common interest doctrine is also sometimes referred to as 
the joint defense privilege when applied to codefendants.”206  Resting on this 
tottering tower of authority, these later courts denied common interest privilege 
for lack of a mutual adversary.207 
They also relied on another district court case,208 Mineaba Co. v. Pabst,209 
which warrants slightly more elaboration.  Like the others, Mineaba began by 
excerpting Hsia at length.210  But it then highlighted the difficulties resulting 
from joint defense and common interest being shoehorned into a single 
doctrine, declaring that protected documents “must be disclosed pursuant to a 
common legal interest and pursuant to an agreement to pursue a joint 
defense.”211  Similarly, Mineaba directly juxtaposes one out-of-circuit 
authority that “the party seeking to claim privilege still must demonstrate that 
the specific communications at issue were designed to facilitate a common 
legal interest; a business or commercial interest will not suffice”212 with 
another finding the privilege “arises out of the need for a common defense, as 
opposed merely to a common problem.”213  The result is no more handsome 
than Dr. Frankenstein’s work;214 demanding that parties simultaneous meet the 
requirements for both the joint defense and common interest doctrines does 
service to neither. 
Finally, courts in the D.C. Circuit215 have occasionally collapsed the 
historical and doctrinal gaps between co-client and common interest 
privileges.216  In Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
                                                 
 206. Id. at 312. 
 207. See Intex, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (“A party which relies on the joint defense privilege or 
common interest doctrine must establish that ‘the parties had agreed to pursue a joint defense 
strategy.’”); NLRB, 257 F.R.D. at 312 (holding that “the definition of ‘common interest’ is not 
entirely settled, but in any event the parties must have a common interest in the prosecution of a 
common defendant”). 
 208. See Intex, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 16; NLRB, 257 F.R.D. at 312. 
 209. 228 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 210. Id. at 15–16. 
 211. Id. at 16. 
 212. Id. (referencing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 
437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 213. Id. (quoting Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 689 F. Supp. 841, 845 
(N.D. Ill. 1988)) (alteration removed). 
 214. See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 
(LACKINGTON, HUGHES, HARDING, MAVOR & JONES 1818). 
 215. E.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d 66, 
74 (D.D.C. 2010); see also United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 
Civ.99-3292004, 2004 WL 2009413, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004). 
 216. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs 
from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”). 
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Eng’rs,217 the district court looked to Sealed Case for precedent on attorney-
client common interest privilege.218  It properly made no mention of a litigation 
requirement, yet then went on to conclude that “the privilege applies only 
where the same attorney represents each of the clients.”219  In fairness, the 
“common interest” posture in Sealed Case itself described a single attorney 
representing multiple clients—properly, co-client privilege—but the court 
hardly limited its reasoning on common interest to that factual posture.220  If 
nothing else, Chesapeake Bay vividly illustrates the confusion occasioned by 
describing doctrine for common interest and co-client privilege in one 
breath.221  Nonetheless, only two years earlier, the court of appeals had more 
clearly defined common interest as applying amongst multiple attorneys.222  
Prior appellate decisions had found that common interest attached in situations 
beyond the co-client context.223  Ambivalent terminology aside, Chesapeake 
Bay simply cannot be reconciled with such controlling precedents.  (And in 
any event, there is no litigation requirement in the co-client context in the D.C. 
Circuit.)224 
Lest the muddle be thought impenetrable, other D.C. Circuit district courts 
have had little trouble distinguishing between joint defense and common 
interest.  For example, Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs.225 treated each of the 
two individually, and enumerated the distinct factors required for each.226  
Meanwhile, after setting forth distinctions between the attorney-client and 
                                                 
 217. 722 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 218. Id. at 74. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The appellant also argues 
that the common interest privilege bars disclosure of his communications with the Lawyer. 
Specifically, he contends that he, Z and the foreign company share an attorney-client privilege 
regarding their consultations with the Lawyer.”).  Indeed, the court made clear separately that the 
“joint defense privilege protects communications between two or more parties and their 
respective counsel if they are engaged in a joint defense effort.” Id. at 719 n.5. 
 221. See sources cited supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 222. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 223. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 224. See, e.g., Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(“This conduct shows that both [co-clients] Jack MacKay and H & B had a common legal interest 
in the development of the aluminum bat patent application.”). 
 225. No. Civ. 99-3298, 2004 WL 2009413 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004). 
 226. Compare id. at *3 (“The joint prosecution privilege protects disclosures between two or 
more parties and their respective counsel if their communications are conducted under a joint 
prosecution agreement.”), with id. at *4 (“The common interest privilege protects disclosures 
between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest or common 
interests.”).  Then again, Pogue mistakenly imported the litigation requirement from the work 
product context, and  it arguably shared Chesapeake Bay’s misconception of common interest as 
applying only to co-clients, so it is hardly a model of clarity. Id. 
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work product privileges, Purcell v. MWI Corp.227 discussed Sealed Case at 
length and explained the differing definitions and purposes for the related but 
distinct joint defense and common interest privileges.228  In short, as was 
manifest in Sealed Case, D.C. Circuit courts “recognize both a joint-defense 
privilege and a common-interest privilege.”229  Having completed this 
comprehensive tour of evidentiary protections, the Purcell court concluded that 
the “overarching principle that governs these privileges remains the same—
protecting attorney-client correspondence on matters of common interest and 
‘protecting attorneys’ preparations for trial and encouraging the fullest 
preparation without fear of access by adversaries.’”230  But like goals do not 
make for identical privileges, and delicate discrimination is necessary to 
navigate the jurisprudential jungle of multi-party privilege. 
III.  COMMON SENSE AND COMMON INTEREST: A WAY FORWARD 
The D.C. Circuit has often treated claims of privilege parsimoniously as 
compared to other jurisdictions.231  As this author has written elsewhere, some 
of its jurisprudence demands disclosure of seemingly privileged material, to 
the point that the Department of Justice has advised that such precedents are no 
longer good law in light of contrary Supreme Court rulings.232  Its court of 
appeals has been particularly severe with regard to waiver of the attorney-
client privilege due to disclosure to a third party: until 2008, “any disclosure 
automatically constitute[d] waiver, even in the case of inadvertent 
disclosure,”233 and that draconian rule was only displaced by the Supreme 
Court’s promulgating Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).234  The court of 
appeals has historically demanded absolute secrecy as the “traditional price” of 
                                                 
 227. 209 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 228. See id. at 25. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)). 
 231. See Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr’ns, 262 F.R.D. 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 232. See Jared S. Sunshine, The Part & Parcel Principle: Applying the Attorney-Client 
Privilege to Email Attachments, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 47, 72–73 & n.100 (2015); compare Mead 
Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (non-confidential 
facts embodied in privileged communications are subject to discovery), with Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981) (facts embodied in privileged communications are 
protected). 
 233. See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Just over a year ago, parties in 
defendants’ position in this Circuit would have no argument to protect against waiver; they would 
simply be dead in the water with an inadvertent disclosure. The District of Columbia Circuit 
found that any disclosure automatically constitutes waiver, even in the case of inadvertent 
disclosure. [] Rule 502(b), enacted on September 19, 2008, overrides the longstanding strict 
construction of waiver in this Circuit.” (citation omitted)). 
 234. Id. 
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the privilege.235  It is therefore not entirely surprising that the D.C. Circuit has 
been unhurried in clearly setting out the exact circumstances under which 
multiple parties may share in the attorney-client privilege through the 
application of common interest. 
There can be no doubt, however, that circuit law recognizes the common 
interest privilege, however cautiously.  True, this has largely been in the 
context of the work product rather than the attorney-client privilege,236 but 
several opinions have addressed the latter, albeit more en passant than vis-à-
vis.237  Most of the heavy lifting is already done: the court of appeals 
distinguished early and often between common interest in the work product 
and attorney-client contexts,238 and between modern common interest and joint 
defense standards.239  What is lacking is a definitive statement on the subject 
from the court of appeals, repudiating the litigation requirement and 
reaffirming the sacrosanctity of privilege even when multiple parties confer on 
legal matters, even before any particularized claim by or against others is 
contemplated.240 
Speaking to the work product context, the court of appeals has already 
articulated the right rationale persuasively, writing that 
a contrary ruling would undermine lawyer effectiveness at a 
particularly critical stage of a legal representation. It is often prior to 
the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped 
either to help clients avoid litigation or to strengthen available 
defenses should litigation occur.  For instance, lawyers routinely . . . 
consider whether business decisions might result in antitrust or 
                                                 
 235. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 236. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Rockwell 
Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 237. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 29 
F.3d 715, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 
21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 238. See Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d at 139–40; United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d 387, 394 
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In 
re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Tr. of Elec. 
Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 
2010); Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 356, 370 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Apollo Grp. Sec. Litig., 251 
F.R.D. 12, 23 (D.D.C. 2008); Nishnic v. Dep’t of Justice, 671 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.D.C. 1987); 
Latin Investment Corp. v. L & L Construction Assoc., Inc., 160 B.R. 262, 263–64 (Bankr. D.C. 
1993). 
 239. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719; see also Purcell, 209 F.R.D. at 25; United States 
ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. Civ. 99-3298, 2004 WL 2009413, at *3–4 
(D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004). 
 240. See supra text supported by notes 236–39 (showing that the breadth of cases on this 
topic do not provide a definitive statement on this aspect of privileges). 
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securities lawsuits . . . . [A]sked by a client to evaluate the antitrust 
implications of a proposed merger and advised that no specific claim 
had yet surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected 
would not likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum 
assessing the merger’s weaknesses, jotting down on a yellow legal 
pad possible areas of vulnerability, or sending a note to a partner—
“After reviewing the proposed merger, I think it’s O.K., although I’m 
a little worried about . . . .  What are your views?”  Nor would the 
partner respond in writing, “I disagree.  This merger is vulnerable 
because . . . .”  Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing, 
note-taking, and communications so critical to effective legal 
thinking would, in Hickman’s words, “demoraliz[e]” the legal 
profession, and “the interests of the clients and the cause of justice 
would be poorly served.”241 
Indeed, the court anticipated Ambac’s logic in concluding that “[w]eakening 
the ability of lawyers to represent clients at the pre-claim stage of anticipated 
litigation would inevitably reduce voluntary compliance with the law, produce 
more litigation, and increase the workload of government law-enforcement 
agencies.”242 
The D.C. Circuit should apply the same reasoning when it comes to common 
interest.243  Particularly in the antitrust and merger setting, Ambac’s 
commonsensical rebuke to the litigation requirement serves both equity and 
economy by facilitating companies’ sidestepping any illegality ab initio.244  
Eight circuits have already agreed in principle, whilst the courts of appeals for 
four circuits—including the D.C. Circuit—have not yet made a clear 
pronouncement.245  Only the Fifth Circuit stands in open rebellion,246 and 
given that it has stood by its precedent,247 and that two of the three states over 
                                                 
 241. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (second modification 
original). 
 242. Id. at 887; cf. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, 998 N.Y.S.2d 
329, 336–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, —- N.E.2d —- (N.Y. 2016). 
 243. Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The government’s argument 
ignores appellants’ legitimate interest in an early assessment of their legal rights.  ‘The first step 
in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through 
the facts with an eye to the legally relevant.’ Maintaining the confidentiality of attorney-client 
communications facilitates this process by encouraging the client to supply his attorney with 
relevant information.” (citations omitted) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 
390–91 (1981)). 
 244. See Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 336–37. 
 245. See supra text supported by notes 142–43. 
 246. See In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001); see also supra text 
supported by notes 113–22. 
 247. See, e.g., Unites States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (following Santa 
Fe, 272 F.3d 705). 
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which it has geographical jurisdiction have codified litigation requirements,248 
it seems likely to remain so.  Unlike the other three circuits that apparently 
remain undecided,249 the D.C. Circuit has evaluated common interest with 
some regularity, and wants only for a decisive formulation.250  Its court of 
appeals therefore has a felicitous opportunity to resolve this thorny and 
recurring issue once and for all. 
The Supreme Court often repeats by rote the conflicting mandates tugging at 
privilege law: protecting the attorney client relationship and adversarial 
process more broadly, at the cost of a less comprehensive truth-finding 
mission.251  Certainly the D.C. Circuit has mouthed that “familiar platitude.”252  
Yet the Supreme Court has also sharply criticized whittling away at the 
margins of “one of the oldest recognized privileges in the law,” and concluded 
that what evidence exists indicates that a robust privilege serves vital ends.253  
The D.C. Circuit has at times agreed, writing that “[l]imitations on the 
attorney-client privilege have therefore been drawn narrowly, to remove the 
privilege only where the privileged relationship is abused.”254  And the 
Supreme Court admonished, in an oft-quoted passage from Upjohn, that an 
“uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely 
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”255  
The present confusion in the D.C. Circuit as to the litigation requirement for 
the common interest privilege spurns Upjohn’s admonition, and in the absence 
of a definitive statement on common interest by the court of appeals (or the 
Supreme Court), the disarray is likely to persist. 
                                                 
 248. See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).  Louisiana is the outlier, 
providing that a “client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another person from 
disclosing, a confidential communication . . . by the client or his lawyer, or a representative of 
either, to a lawyer, or representative of a lawyer, who represents another party concerning a 
matter of common interest.”  LA. CODE. EVID. art. 506(b)(3). 
 249. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 358 (discussing the Sixth 
Circuit); id. at 363 (discussing the Tenth Circuit); id. at 364 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit). 
 250. See supra text supported by notes 236–40. 
 251. E.g., Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189  (1990); Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974); see also Schaffzin, 
supra note 7, at 56–58 (discussing the attorney-client privilege), 58–59 (discussing the joint 
defense privilege), 67–68 (discussing the common interest privilege). 
 252. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The familiar 
platitude is that the privilege is narrowly confined because it hinders the courts in the search for 
truth.”); e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 
793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Each of the recognized privileges protects a substantial individual 
interest or a relationship in which society has an interest, at the expense of the public interest in 
the search for truth.”). 
 253. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409–10 n.4 (1998). 
 254. Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 255. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
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In any event, the D.C. Circuit’s joining the emerging consensus against a 
litigation requirement will not heal all the woes of common interest doctrine 
for merging companies.  Ambac addressed the situation in which the 
companies had already executed merger and non-disclosure agreements, 
lending substance to their claims of commonality.256  Where does that leave 
parties contemplating the antitrust implications (or any other legalities) of a 
merger prior to signing an agreement?  An Illinois court professedly could not 
understand how market participants could share a common interest antedating 
a signed agreement: “Prior to the merger, these organizations stood on opposite 
sides of a business transaction.  From a business standpoint and from a legal 
standpoint, the merger parties’ interests stood opposed to each other.  They had 
no common interest, and indeed, their interests were in conflict.”257  This is 
probably the more broadly-held view: “of the cases addressing a party’s 
disclosure of confidential information during negotiations, almost all have held 
that such disclosure waives the privilege.”258  Some, however, have been more 
open to finding common interest even whilst deals are still being negotiated, 
claiming the weight of case law points to privilege.259  Such reasoning seems 
particularly persuasive in the antitrust context, where even prior to an 
agreement, both parties have the same legal interest in assessing the 
defensibility of the ensuing combination. 
And what of intermediate stages, for example, where the parties have signed 
non-disclosure but not merger agreements?  Courts do look to non-disclosure 
agreements as evidence of confidentiality supporting common interest.260  But 
the prudent practitioner should at least reduce any understandings between 
                                                 
 256. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336–37 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016); accord 
United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). 
 257. In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., No. 06 C 4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007); see, e.g., Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190 
(D. Del. 2004); Cheeves v. S. Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 131 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 39 F.3d 
326 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 258. Oak Indus. v Zenith Indus., No. 86-C-4302, 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 
1988). 
 259. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 62 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The weight of the 
case law suggests that, as a general matter, privileged information disclosed during a merger 
between two unaffiliated businesses would fall within the common-interest doctrine.”) (citing, 
inter alia, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
and Rayman v. Am. Charter Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 655 (D. Neb. 1993)).  But 
see Oak Indus., 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (explaining why the court declined to follow Hewlett-
Packard). 
 260. See, e.g., Tenneco Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, No. 
98 C 2679, 1999 WL 754748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple, 
Inc., 890 F. Supp.2d 508, 518 (D. Del. 2012). 
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potential merger participants to a written common interest agreement.261  In 
any common interest arrangement, and particularly in exploratory merger 
discussions, the parties may ultimately fail to come to terms, and litigation may 
ensue.262  The parties may be pursuing other interests that are divergent or even 
adversarial.263  Counsel for both sides must therefore weigh the advantages of 
sharing information against the disadvantages;264 a written agreement can set 
forth the parties’ obligations in the event of the common legal interest’s 
cessation or the parties’ divergence.265 
Common interest presents knotty issues of law, which are made none the 
easier by ostensible doctrinal disarray.  But the confusion is not as intractable 
as some commentators would have it.  One complained that courts are widely 
split as to whether a written agreement is necessary, whether there is a 
litigation requirement, and whether the common interest need be identical.266  
But in fact there is general consensus that an oral agreement may suffice for 
the privilege just as it would for any other contract,267 and that a litigation 
requirement is counterproductive, at least in federal courts.268  In fairness, there 
is much variation as to the necessary degree of similarity of interests.269  All in 
all, however, much of the confusion with common interest is more semantic 
                                                 
 261. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 44 (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler & 
Schulman Asset Mgt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986)); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 81–
83; Fischer, supra note 25, at 649–50; Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 151–52.  Common interest 
does not require a writing, but memorializing any agreement is undoubtedly prudent both to avoid 
misunderstandings and provide evidence to any court. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 81–82; 
Fischer, supra note 25, at 649–50; e.g., HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 
F.R.D. 64, 72–73 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[W]hile Nordbank and the non-party lenders wisely 
chose to reduce their common agreement to writing, their decision to do so does not mean that 
there was no prior agreement. To the contrary, Nordbank has made a persuasive showing that the 
parties shared a common interest . . .”); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 362 F. Supp. 2d 407, 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 262. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1985); see also Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 309–10. 
 263. See generally United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979); Eureka 
Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 
108, 111–12 (D. Conn. 1997); In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493 (Bankr. Del. 2010); 330 
Acquisition Co. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B, 783 N.Y.S.2d. 805, 805–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004); GUS Consulting GMBH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2008). 
 264. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 354, 365–66; Rosenthal, supra 
note 42, at 150–51; e.g., Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D.R.I. 1996). 
 265. Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 151; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 
365–66. 
 266. See Giesel, supra note 23. 
 267. See RICE, supra note  2, § 4:35 at 246 n.10; supra note 261. 
 268. See supra Section I.B. 
 269. See, e.g., supra text supported by note 84. 
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than substantive, and resoluble largely by more careful selection of language in 
arguments and opinions.270  Common interest serves a vital role in increasingly 
entangled legal representations, and a clarified understanding of its posture vis-
































                                                 
 270. See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (criticizing 
the “undifferentiated use” of “joint defense” and “common interest”); Giesel, supra note 23, at 
478 n.5 (“cataloguing the mishmash of terms”); George S. Mahaffey Jr., Taking Aim at the 
Hydra: Why the “Allied-Party Doctrine” Should Not Apply in Qui Tam Cases When the 
Government Declines to Intervene, 23 REV. LITIG. 629, 631–33 (2004). 
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